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Regulating Sugar-Sweetened Beverages
Tyler Rauh*
American waistlines are an international punchline, and United
States taxpayers spend hundreds of billions of dollars each year
to combat medical complications resulting from obesity. The
personal costs are financial, emotional, and mortal. Projections
insist that it will become worse. Section I details the obesity
epidemic and ponders why the United States is uniquely
unhealthy.
The reason could be that America consumes more sugar than any
other country. In recent years, some municipal policymakers have
attempted to restrain America’s sweet tooth by taxing sugarsweetened beverages. Initial responses are polarizing. Chicago’s
tax did not last three months before its abolishment.
Philadelphia’s tax raised over sixty-five million dollars in its first
ten months, but public opinion skews negative. The health effects,
however, have been positive. Section II analyzes the benefits and
concerns regarding these sugar-sweetened beverage taxes, and it
*
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will compare approaches in other countries that may be more
effective at reducing obesity.
Mandated disclosures, including nutritional panels and warnings,
are another tactic legislators have used to combat the epidemic.
San Francisco took an inspired approach to battling sugar
consumption by mandating a disclosure on print advertisements
for sugar-sweetened beverages: “WARNING: drinking beverages
with added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth
decay.” The American Beverage Association met the ordinance
with a First Amendment challenge. It convinced a Ninth Circuit
panel that the message chills commercial speech by forcing its
members to convey a controversial message and imposing an
undue burden on beverage manufacturers because non-beverage
sugar producers arbitrarily escape the ordinance’s purview. In an
en banc rehearing, the Ninth Circuit confirmed reversal, but it did
so only on the ground that the size of the warning was unduly
burdensome. The judges disagreed on many issues in reaching
that conclusion. Section III assesses the freedom of speech claim
and finds that the Ninth Circuit panel may have reached its
conclusion based on biased or flawed research.
Although the panel decision hinted that policymakers’ options for
fighting the obesity epidemic are limited, sugar taxes and
mandatory disclosures can still be effective if correctly
implemented. Section IV concludes with a proposal for extensive
sugar taxes and warnings, similar to the tobacco strategy in recent
decades, so that consumers have more knowledge about what they
are ingesting while being financially incentivized to choose
healthier options.
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I.
A.

INTRODUCTION

America’s Big, Unique Problem

The United States is facing an epidemic. From coast to coast, obesity
rates have reached unprecedented heights.1 In 1991, obese adults made up
less than fifteen percent of the population in most states.2 Recent surveys,
however, indicate over a third of American adults are obese.3
The trend is not confined to adults. Childhood obesity rates have
climbed to over seventeen percent,4 a significant increase from eleven
1

See Maggie Fox, America’s Obesity Epidemic Hits a New High, NBC NEWS (June 7,
2016, 1:40 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/america-s-obesityepidemic-hits-new-high-n587251.
2
Obese adult is medically defined as an adult having a body mass index surpassing
thirty percent. See Maggie Fox, If you think we’re fat now, wait till 2030, NBC NEWS (Sept.
18, 2012, 10:03 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/if-you-think-werefat-now-wait-till-2030-f1B5955205.
3
See Cynthia L. Ogden et. al., Prevalence of Obesity Among Adults and Youth: United
States, 2011–2014, 219 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 1, 1 (2015),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db219.pdf.
4
Id. at 5.
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percent in the early nineties and four percent in the early seventies.5 These
trends have led researchers to predict that over forty percent of American
adults will be obese by 2030.6
Obesity rates over forty percent could spell disaster for the future of
the United States. While obesity is often viewed through a cosmetic lens,
the nature of the epidemic lies in the devastating health effects it causes.
Obese people are at an increased risk for high blood pressure, stroke,
coronary heart disease, gallbladder disease, osteoarthritis, anxiety,
depression, liver cancer, breast cancer, colon cancer, endometrial cancer,
and other harmful health problems.7 The best predictor of type 2 diabetes
is being overweight or obese.8 Type 2 diabetes is usually diagnosed after
the age of forty, but now it is found in children and adolescents.9 Diabetes
and its related complications are major causes of mortality in the United
States, with an estimated quarter-million deaths attributed to the disease
each year despite being largely preventable.10
Beyond the dire consequences at the personal level, obesity also
imposes significant costs on society. Health care spending estimates for
obesity are as high as $210 billion annually.11 Estimated indirect costs,
which relate to morbidity and productivity, are $450 billion each year.12
The epidemic’s substantial financial and mortal costs ultimately spurred
three decades of research to find a solution.13
Research indicates obesity has many factors. Some factors are outside
of an individual’s control, such as genetics or illness.14 Others are a

5
Health, United States, 2004, 28 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 1, 179
(2004), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus04trend.pdf.
6
Lauran Neergard, No end to US obesity epidemic, forecast shows, NBC NEWS (May
7,
2012,
7:20
PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/47324248/ns/healthdiet_and_nutrition/t/no-end-us-obesity-epidemic-forecast-shows/.
7
The Health Effects of Overweight and Obesity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/effects/index.html (last updated June 5,
2015) (citations omitted).
8
See Michael K. Palmer & Peter P. Toth, Trends in Lipids, Obesity, Metabolic
Syndrome, and Diabetes Mellitus in the United States: An NHANES Analysis (2003-2004
to 2013-2014), 27 THE OBESITY SOC’Y 309, 309–14 (Feb. 2019).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Alex Brill, The Long-Term Returns of Obesity Prevention Policies, MATRIX GLOBAL
ADVISORS 1 (Apr. 2013), https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/reports/2013/
rwjf405694.
12
Id.
13
See Fox, supra note 1.
14
See Adult Obesity Causes & Consequences, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/adult/causes.html (last updated Mar. 5, 2018).
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consequence of environment, including socioeconomic factors.15 But
policymakers and organizations have used resources to influence people
to make better decisions regarding factors that are typically within an
individual’s control—lack of physical activity, excessive calorie
consumption, and deficient nutritional education.16 Organized efforts to
induce Americans to lose weight have, however, failed to curtail climbing
obesity rates.17
The research is not for naught, though. The United States ranks
second, behind only Austria, in calorie consumption by capita, with
Greece, Belgium, and Italy not far behind.18 Yet the United States is the
only nation of that group to appear on the list of the top-ten most obese
countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), with the notorious distinction of being the only
country with more than thirty-five percent of its population obese.19 Each
of those other four countries has a moderate obesity rate between nineteen
and twenty-five percent.20 This indicates that the obesity epidemic may not
be due to the volume of calories an average American consumes but,
rather, the nutritional nature of those calories. Research and legislation
have thus shifted to another area where the United States leads all other
countries: sugar consumption.21

B.

Sugar’s Role in the Obesity Epidemic

The gap between the United States and Germany, second-highest on
the list of countries ranked by average daily sugar intake, is larger than the
gap between Germany and Saudi Arabia, which is fifteenth on the list.22
15

See Nia S. Mitchell et al., Obesity: Overview of an Epidemic, 2011 PSYCHIATR. CLIN.
N. AM. 1, 4–5, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3228640/pdf/nihms
334812.pdf.
16
See Paula Whitacre & Annina Burns, Perspectives from the United Kingdom and
United States Policy Makers on Obesity Prevention, 2010 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L
ACADS.
1,
20
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK220236/pdf/Bookshelf_
NBK220236.pdf.
17
See Fox, supra note 1.
18
Food Consumption Nutrients, 2008 FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/ess/documents/food_security_statistics/FoodCon
sumptionNutrients_en.xls.
19
Prevalence of Obesity Among Adults, BMI≥30, Age-Standardized Estimates by
Country, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.CTRY2450A?
lang=en (last updated Sept. 22, 2017).
20
Id.
21
Roberto A. Ferdman, Where people around the world eat the most sugar and fat, THE
WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/05
/where-people-around-the-world-eat-the-most-sugar-and-fat/?utm_term=.8680dc0d6005
(last updated Jan. 29, 2019).
22
Id.
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At 126.4 grams of sugar per day, the average United States citizen is
consuming more than double what the World Health Organization
recommends for daily intake.23
Analyzing other countries produces a positive correlation between
sugar consumption and elevated levels of obesity. Australia, Canada,
Mexico, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom each have average daily
sugar intakes between eighty-two and ninety-six grams, placing them
within the fifteen countries that consume the most sugar.24 Each of those
nations also falls within third and eighth on the list of the most obese
OECD countries.25
Vanguard policymakers addressing America’s status as a gluttonous
nation believe they can curtail the obesity epidemic by deterring sugar
consumption.26 But the question remains as to the best strategy in attacking
the sweetener. Some advocate for sugar taxes, citing the revenue it could
generate while potentially reducing obesity.27 Part II of this paper will
focus on the potential income, the initial public response, and the
effectiveness of implementing an excise tax on sugar-sweetened
beverages. Part II also proposes a version of the tax that is variable upon
the quantity of sugar within the drink, not the quantity of liquid, to
overcome the shortcomings of a traditional excise tax on sugar-sweetened
beverages.
Some municipalities have taken more creative approaches than taxes.
In 2012, under former mayor Michael Bloomberg, New York City’s Board
of Health passed a ban on selling sugary drinks in excess of sixteen ounces
at movie theaters, restaurants, mobile food carts, and sports arenas.28 The
beverage cap was, however, struck down by the New York State Court of
Appeals due to the Board of Health acting outside its scope of regulatory

23

Id.
Id.
25
Prevalence of Obesity Among Adults, BMI ≥ 30, Age-Standardized Estimates by
Country, supra note 19.
26
See Jennifer L. Pomeranz et. al., Innovative Legal Approaches to Address Obesity, 87
MILBANK QUARTERLY 185, 189 (2009), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/sugarman
/Milbank_published.pdf (explaining that the FTC, as early as 1978, initiated rules for sugar
product television advertising aimed towards children).
27
See Cabrera Escobar et al., Evidence that a tax on sugar sweetened beverages reduces
the obesity rate: A Meta-Analysis, 2016 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1, 6
https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-131072?site=bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com.
28
See Nadia Arumugam, Why Soda Ban Will Work In Fight Against Obesity; Food
Regulations Have Proven Record, 2019 FORBES MEDIA LLC, (last updated Sep. 14, 2012
1:35 PM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/nadiaarumugam/2012/09/14/why-soda-ban-willwork-in-fight-against-obesity-food-regulations-have-a-proven-record/#2e6fda254d86
24
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authority.29 Three years later, San Francisco unanimously passed an
ordinance requiring advertisements for sugar-sweetened beverages to
contain a black box warning: “drinking beverages with added sugar(s)
contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.”30 Part III analyzes the
First Amendment challenge that ordinance faced from the American
Beverage Association. The issue hinged upon whether the warning met the
Zauderer standard: a compelled disclosure is required to be purely factual
and uncontroversial without being unduly burdensome on the advertiser
so as to chill its commercial speech.31 This test necessitates an inquiry into
sugar consumption science and whether the requirement creates an unfair
burden on beverage companies when compared to other sugar suppliers,
both of which will also be discussed in Part III.
The Ninth Circuit panel concluded the message is controversial and
the warning imposed an undue burden for beverage companies, and thus
the ordinance failed the Zauderer standard.32 This decision could pose
issues for future legislation that mandates disclosure requirements on
beverage companies. Part IV will take measure of what the future may
hold for beverage suppliers’ advertising practices and argues that, for
sugar warnings to be constitutionally permissible, food manufacturers
must have the same mandated disclosures as beverage manufacturers.

II.

BITTERSWEET TAXES

Proponents of a city- or county-level sugar tax believe it can kill two
birds with one stone: reduce obesity and bolster budgets.33 Advocates for
a sugar tax have gained support in recent years with at least seven
municipalities placing taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages since 2015.34
Philadelphia enacted a 1.5 cent-per-ounce tax at the beginning of 2017;35
and Seattle’s ordinance—at 1.75 cents-per-ounce—triggered at the

29

See New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New York
City Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene, 23 N.E.3d 538, 541 (N.Y. 2014).
30
Am. Bev. Ass’n v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 871 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 2017).
31
Id. at 891–92.
32
Id. at 895–97.
33
See Angelica LaVito, Cook County’s repeal of its ‘soda tax’ may pause efforts in other
cities, CNBC NEWS, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/01/cook-countys-repeal-of-its-sodatax-may-pause-efforts-in-other-cities.html (last updated Dec. 1, 2017, 7:17 PM).
34
Id.
35
Courtney Shupert & Scott Drenkard, Soda Tax Experiment Failing in Philadelphia
Amid Consumer Angst and Revenue Shortfalls, TAX FOUNDATION (Aug. 3, 2017),
https://taxfoundation.org/philadelphia-soda-tax-failing/.
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beginning of 2018.36 But opponents of the tax have made their voices
heard. Cook County, home to Chicago, passed a sugary drink tax that
lasted fewer than three months before falling to the pressure of the masses
clamoring for its end.37 And voters in Santa Fe rejected a similar soda tax
referendum in May 2017.38
The following subsections will discuss the financial advantages and
disadvantages of a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages; the potential for a
tax to effectively reduce obesity in the United States; and a proposal for a
variable tax referendum that charges suppliers by the level of sugar in the
drink (e.g., a penny-per-teaspoon of sugar), instead of the beverage’s
overall volume, so as to maximize the tax’s deterrence effect while
minimizing arbitrary distinctions to determine if beverages will fall within
the purview of a sugar tax.

A. Uncle Sam’s Sweet Tooth: Will a Tax Help the Cause or Cause
a Cavity in Consumers’ Wallets?
1. Initial research results on sugar taxes are inconclusive
but skew positive.
Efforts have been made, both domestically and internationally, to
research the merits of a sugar tax’s effect on public health.39 The City of
Seattle granted the University of Washington $500,000 to study the
effectiveness, implementation, and unintended consequences of the King
County beverage tax that took effect at the beginning of 2018.40 And
Michael Bloomberg continued his advocacy of soda regulation by granting

36

See Patrick Quinn, New Year, new tax: Seattle starts taxing sweetened drinks, KOMO
NEWS (Jan. 1, 2018), http://komonews.com/news/local/new-year-new-tax-seattle-startstaxing-sweetened-drinks.
37
Caitlin Dewey, Why Chicago’s soda tax fizzled after two months – and what it means
for
the
anti-soda
movement,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
10,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/10/10/why-chicagos-soda-taxfizzled-after-two-months-and-what-it-means-for-the-anti-soda-movement/?
utm_term=.73c61fee6f2c.
38
Id.
39
Jason M. Fletcher, David Frisvold & Nathan Tefft, Can Soft Drink Taxes Reduce
Population
Weight?,
CONTEMPORARY ECON. POL’Y
1–2
(Jan.
2010),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2908024/pdf/nihms-151114.pdf.
40
Bernard Ellouk, University of Washington to study Seattle soda tax, KING 5 NEWS
(Dec. 29, 2017, 4:04 AM), http://www.king5.com/article/news/health/university-ofwashington-to-study-seattle-soda-tax/281-503028380.
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the University of Illinois at Chicago $2.5 million to study whether the
sugar tax improves public health over an extended period of time.41
An initial meta-analysis covering the United States, Mexico, France,
and Brazil shows that an increase in the price of sugar-sweetened
beverages is associated with a decrease in sugar consumption and modest
reductions in weight in the population.42 As a corollary, the price increase
on sugar-sweetened beverages also resulted in increased consumption of
healthier beverages, such as milk.43 In contrast, a systemic literature
review claims the effectiveness of a taxation policy to curb obesity is
doubtful.44 That study bases its conclusion on the behavioral and
environmental factors that result in consumers’ poor substitution
tendencies: if their preferred food or drink is taxed, then consumers often
choose to consume even more calories from other foods or drinks
instead.45 Ultimately, the only universal consensus is that research
regarding the impact of a tax on obesity rates is incomplete without
sufficient real-life tests to determine how large the influence could be in
the United States.46
Researchers claim the tax is working in Mexico, however.47 The
country imposed a peso-per-liter tax on sugar-sweetened beverages at the
beginning of 2014 in an attempt to slim down from the second-most obese
nation in the world.48 Estimates claim that Mexicans consumed almost ten
percent fewer sugary drinks in 2015 than they would have if the tax never
took effect.49 But the data from Mexico is difficult to apply to United
States cities due to “leakage.”50 The Mexican tax is nationwide, but
41
Greg Trotter, $2.5 million Bloomberg grant funds UIC study on Cook County soda
tax, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Sept. 25, 2017, 12:55 PM), http://www.chicagotribune
.com/business/ct-biz-cook-county-soda-tax-study-20170925-story.html.
42
See Escobar et al., supra note 27.
43
Id.
44
Nikolaos Maniadakis et al., A systemic review of the effectiveness of taxes on
nonalcoholic beverages and high-in-fat foods as a means to prevent obesity trends,
CLINICOECONOMICS
AND
OUTCOMES
RES.
523–24
(Oct.
18,
2013),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3810203/pdf/ceor-5-519.pdf.
45
Id.
46
Roberta R. Friedman, A Soda Tax — Will it Change Anything?, OBESITY ACTION
COALITION,
http://www.obesityaction.org/educational-resources/resource-articles-2/
nutrition/a-soda-tax-will-it-change-anything.
47
Ronnie Cohen, Taxes trimmed Mexican soda consumption for two years, REUTERS
(Mar. 1, 2017, 3:22 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-soda-taxes/taxestrimmed-mexican-soda-consumption-for-two-years-idUSKBN1685JM.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
See Lizzie Wade, Mexico’s Soda Tax is Working. The US Should Learn From It.,
WIRED (July 13, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/mexicos-soda-taxworking-us-learn/.
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citizens of American localities with a beverage tax may simply cross city
or county lines to stock up on their favorite soda. Such leakage makes the
tax much easier to avoid.51 In Seattle, local Costco stores posted signs
telling shoppers where to go to avoid the tax.52 Likewise, many Chicago
residents near the border of Cook County made “pop runs to Indiana”
during the tax’s couple months of existence, causing local businesses to
lose some consumers.53 Experts say the lack of leakage in Mexico could
make its data more broadly applicable because it affects more people in
different kinds of communities—from the poorest rural areas to the richest
in Mexico City—as opposed to data that emerges from American cities
where a sugar tax could have a more drastic relative impact on low-income
households.54

2. Sugar-sweetened beverage taxes: a war on the poor?
Sugar-sweetened beverage taxes disproportionately target the poor,
for better or worse. The poorer Mexican households have shown the
largest drops in sugary beverage purchases with a nearly twelve percent
decrease over the initial two years of the tax.55 This could be an
encouraging sign considering low-income neighborhoods have a higher
prevalence of diabetes than wealthy neighborhoods.56 But opponents of
the tax, including Senator Bernie Sanders, claim that this is a cause for
concern because the tax disproportionately hurts the poor.57 For example,
in Philadelphia the price for a 24-ounce drink that normally costs a dollar
increased to $1.35 with the 1.5 cent-per-ounce tax.58 If consumed once
daily, that extra thirty-five cents would amount to over one percent of the
yearly earnings for the 185,000 people living on less than $12,000 per year
51

Id.
Suzanne Phan, Seattle’s new soda tax prices making some shoppers’ eyes ‘pop’,
KOMO NEWS (Jan. 5, 2018), http://komonews.com/news/local/seattle-soda-tax-surprisingshoppers-tax-revenue-to-go-to-food-accesseducation-programs.
53
Greg Trotter, No tears for end of Cook County soda tax – and no more pop runs to
Indiana, CHI. TRIBUNE (Dec. 1, 2017, 12:25 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business
/ct-biz-soda-tax-repeal-reaction-20171201-story.html.
54
See Wade, supra note 50.
55
See Escobar et al., supra note 27.
56
Doreen M Rabi et al., Association of socio-economic status with diabetes prevalence
and utilization of diabetes care services, BMC HEALTH SERVS. RES. 5 (Oct. 3, 2006),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1618393/pdf/1472-6963-6-124.pdf.
57
Bernie Sanders, A Soda Tax Would Hurt Philly’s Low-Income Families, PHILA MAG.
(Apr. 24, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://www.phillymag.com/citified/2016/04/24/bernie-sanderssoda-tax-op-ed/.
58
Daniel Banko-Ferran, Philly’s Soda Tax Will Disproportionately Hurt the Poor,
ECONOMICS21 (Jan. 9, 2017), https://economics21.org/html/philly%E2%80%99s-sodatax-will-disproportionately-hurt-poor-2186.html.
52
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in Philadelphia.59 The extra tax could impose difficult decisions on citizens
with limited financial flexibility: is a lifestyle change in order or will the
extra cost come from a different part of their budget?
The tax disproportionately hurts the poor because low-income
Americans drink the most soda.60 While the popularity of soda has been
falling over recent years within the middle and upper classes, the same has
not happened among the low-income class.61 More popular among the
middle and upper classes are custom-made beverages from places such as
Starbucks.62 Beverages from these locations, however, are exempt from
current versions of most sugar taxes despite often containing more sugar
than soda.63 For example, in Seattle, lattés and cappuccinos are considered
beverages in which milk is the primary natural ingredient, placing them in
an exempt category.64 Other exempt categories include baby formula and
cough syrup (i.e., products that do not contribute to obesity).65
Diet soda is also more popular among high-income Americans than
low-income Americans.66 Yet diet soda has escaped the purview of some
sugar taxes,67 despite research indicating daily consumption of diet soda is
associated with obesity and a sixty-seven percent greater risk of type 2
diabetes when compared to non-consumption.68 Some critics claim these
factors indicate that the tax does not exist to promote greater public health,
but rather it is an upper class war on the poor: the financially unfortunate
get an extra tax on their preferred daily beverage, while the upper and

59

See id.
Martha C. White, The Paradox of the Sugar Tax: How Buying a Soda Benefits
Services for the Poor, NBC NEWS (June 19, 2017, 11:35 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com
/business/consumer/paradox-sugar-tax-how-buying-soda-benefits-services-poorn773341.
61
Id.
62
See Vince Dixon, What Do Starbucks Locations Really Say About Income and
Diversity in America? EATER (Nov. 20, 2015, 11:33 AM), https://www.eater.com/a/
starbucks-income-map.
63
Compare
STARBUCKS,
https://www.starbucks.com/menu/catalog/product?
drink=espresso#view_control=nutrition,
with
COCA-COLA,
https://www.cocacolaproductfacts.com/en/products/.
64
See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) for the Sweetened Beverage Tax, CITY OF
SEATTLE,
https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/FAS/BusinessLicenseTax/
sweetened-beverage-tax-frequently-asked-questions.pdf
65
Id.
66
Daniel Beekman, Prices going up for sugary drinks as Seattle tax kicks in, THE
SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/promoting-health-ata-hefty-price-seattles-soda-tax-starts-jan-1/ (last updated Jan. 1, 2018, 1:15 AM).
67
Id.
68
Jennifer A. Nettleton et al., Diet Soda Intake and Risk of Incident Metabolic Syndrome
and Type 2 Diabetes in the Multi-Ethnic Study of Atherosclerosis (MESA), 32 DIABETES
CARE 688, 691 (2009).
60
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middle classes can enjoy their equally unhealthy choice with no
upcharge.69
Advocates for the tax retort that the price increase is aimed to help the
low-income population long-term, both financially and medicinally.70 The
primary objective is to discourage people from buying sugary drinks, not
necessarily make people pay more for sustenance.71 Doctors,
psychologists, and economists believe people will be encouraged to make
the healthier choice when forced to pay more for a sugar-sweetened
beverage than water, sugarless soda, or milk.72 This should be especially
true for low-income consumers who have a higher sensitivity to price
increases.73 After consistently making healthier beverage choices by
reducing the consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages, there should be
a positive effect on health and obesity among low-income populations.74

3. The macro financial consequences of a sugar-sweetened
beverage tax
A reduction in obese and overweight individuals would result in
substantial health care savings at both personal and public levels.75 Studies
show that annual per-person medical costs for overweight individuals are
$266 and $1,723 for obese individuals (circa 2008 American dollars).76 At
the public level, the costs amount to hundreds of billions of dollars.77 Sugar
tax proponents argue that the tax simply provides an immediate economic
incentive to make a choice that will save the consumer and society
immense amounts of money long-term while simultaneously preventing

69
See Chriss W. Street, Berkeley’s Soda Tax is Upper-Class War on the Poor,
BREITBART (Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.breitbart.com/california/2016/08/27/berkeleyssoda-tax-upper-class-war-poor/.
70
See White, supra note 60; Gretchen Frazee, How taxing sugary drinks affects a
community’s health and economy, PBS NEWSHOUR (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.pbs.org
/newshour/economy/making-sense/how-taxing-sugary-drinks-affects-a-communityshealth-and-economy.
71
See Beekman, supra note 66.
72
See Alexandra Wright, Katherine E. Smith & Mark Hellowell, Policy lessons from
health taxes: a systemic review of empirical studies, BMC PUBLIC HEALTH 12 (2017),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5477308/pdf/12889_2017_Article_4497.
pdf.
73
M.A. Colchero et al., Price elasticity of the demand for sugar sweetened beverages
and soft drinks in Mexico, 19 ECON. AND HUMAN BIOLOGY 129, 134 (2015).
74
See id. at 135.
75
See ADAM G. TSAI, DAVID F. WILLIAMSON & HENRY A. GLICK, Direct medical cost of
overweight and obesity in the United States: a quantitative systemic review, 12 OBESITY
REVIEW 50, 56 (2011).
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Id. at 59.
77
See Brill, supra note 11.
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premature mortality.78 And those that forego the economic incentive will
provide revenue to help offset the expenses of obesity as they drink
products that contribute to the obesity epidemic, thereby mitigating their
damage on society.79
The tax’s economic benefits are not strictly long-term or health
related.80 Seattle anticipates $14.8 million in 2018 revenues from its new
tax.81 The city intends to spend at least $3 million of the proceeds on
educational programs and other community-wide incentives; $500,000 on
a program designed to train workers adversely affected by the reduction in
beverage sales; and millions more on providing affordable access to
healthy, nutritional foods for its citizens.82 In Philadelphia, the city
primarily passed a sugar tax to fund free city-wide pre-kindergarten
education and other community programs.83 The city’s total take after the
first ten months was $66.2 million.84 And there are already encouraging
signs of positive health benefits in Philadelphia, despite the tax being
primarily focused on generating revenue.85 A study of the city’s sugar tax,
which analyzed 109 million transactions, found bottled water sales
increased nine percent and carbonated soft drink sales fell fifty-five
percent in the city.86 Leakage was likely responsible for some of the
reduction in carbonated soft drinks because sales rose thirty-eight percent
just outside of the city,87 but early reports are promising on both the
financial and health fronts.
Municipal sugar taxes are in an infantile stage, however, and may not
survive to toddlerhood.88 A public backlash promptly dispatched the Cook
County tax;89 and shoppers’ initial shock in Seattle could spell a similar
78

See Tamar Haspel, Is a soda tax the solution to America’s obesity problem?, WASH.
POST (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/is-a-soda-tax-thesolution-to-americas-obesity-problem/2015/03/23/b6216864-ccf8-11e4-a2a79517a3a70506_story.html?utm_term=.e918bd60b928.
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See SEATTLE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, Sweetened Beverage Tax Proceeds,
http://mayorburgess.seattle.gov/2017/09/sweetened-beverage-tax-proceeds/.
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See Mark Dent, Philly soda tax year one: The finances, fights and its future, BILLY
PENN (Dec. 12, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://billypenn.com/2017/12/12/philly-soda-tax-yearone-the-finances-fights-and-its-future/.
84
Id.
85
See Angelica LaVito, Philadelphia’s soda tax isn’t the windfall some had hoped for,
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https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/22/philadelphias-soda-tax-isnt-the-windfallsome-had-hoped-for.html (last updated Aug. 23, 2017, 4:37 PM).
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fate for its tax.90 The problem may be that the bulk of the tax is being felt
at the retail level, resulting in bloated prices for the consumer.91 An input
tax in the supply chain may be more amenable to consumers and a superior
public health bet.92

B.

Taxing the Quantity of Sugar, Not the Quantity of Liquid

If producers are taxed by the quantity of sugar in the products they
supply, then there would be a financial incentive to reformulate the drinks
to contain less sugar.93 This would be most effective as a national tax,94
but two efforts by Representative Rosa L. DeLauro (D-Conn) never
advanced out of committee.95 Yet municipal- and county-level taxes could
still encourage healthier reformulations for regional brands and even
national brands if enough cities adopt sugar taxes.96 Current tax paradigms
solely based on drink volume, however, ignore the diversity in sugar
content and the potential health effects.97 A sugar volume tax should
encourage consumers to favor low-sugar products over high-sugar
products.98 This is based on the logic that consumers presented with a
cheaper price for drinks with less sugar will likely consume less soda
overall, or they will choose healthier versions of sugary drinks due to the
cost efficiency.99
There are three promising ways to tax beverages based on their sugar
content: a single-tier tax, a multi-tier tax, and a sugar content tax.100 A
sugar content tax would proportionally vary with a drink’s sugar
content.101 The United States government already uses a similar system for
alcoholic drinks.102 Although a system that taxes proportionately to sugar
content would inform the public of exactly how much sugar is in each
beverage, the system could be difficult to apply in practice if the costs are
90

See also Phan, supra note 52.
See Haspel, supra note 78.
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passed directly to the customer. This is because the various levels of sugar
found in soft drinks could produce a strain on inventory systems due to
awkward pricing consequences at the retail level.103 Tiered systems
alleviate this concern.
A single-tier system sets a threshold amount of sugar and taxes any
beverage with more than that amount.104 Such a design was implemented
in Hungary in 2011 with a threshold amount of nineteen grams per eightounce serving.105 This was passed with a similar tax also placed on
unhealthy sweets in the country.106 The results have been positive: a nearly
twenty percent reduction in sugar-sweetened beverages and a thirty
percent reduction in pre-packaged sweets.107 Hungary also reports some
companies reduced the amount of sugar in their drinks to under nineteen
grams per eight-ounce serving in anticipation of the tax.108 And models
suggest that a one-tier system is the most likely avenue to induce
manufacturers to reformulate their products to fall under the tax
threshold.109
The United Kingdom implemented a multi-tier system at the
beginning of 2018.110 Drinks with total sugar content above five grams per
100 milliliters are subject to a tax of eighteen pence (twenty-two cents) per
liter, while the rate for drinks with more than eight grams will be taxed at
twenty-four pence (twenty-nine cents) per liter.111 The United Kingdom
tax was effective eight months prior to its implementation because soda
companies began reducing sugar in their products to cut tax costs.112 CocaCola stated it has over two hundred reformulation initiatives under way
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111
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and has already cut sugar levels in Sprite and Fanta by thirty-percent in the
United Kingdom.113
An input sugar tax, such as these tiered systems, is better at improving
public health when compared to the taxes found in Seattle and Chicago
because “an economist wants to place the tax as close to what you want to
reduce as possible.”114 It gives two shots at fostering healthy habits:
beverage manufacturers will be persuaded to use less sugar to fall under
the tax threshold, and consumers will have an economic incentive to
choose minimal sugar in the store.115 Tiered systems also encourage
businesses to devote product development, marketing, and pricing efforts
to lower-sugar options.116 The current tax in major United States cities
passes most of the cost to the consumer at the retail level and is thus more
regressive, falling heavily on low-income families,117 and the price
increases have created an uproar.118
Some experts claim that the regressive nature of sugar taxes is
overstated, and the progression in long-term health among low-income
consumers actually diminishes the financial regression to a marginal
amount.119 They point to the same principal argument that cigarette
regulation advocates have promulgated over the past 15–20 years: the
taxes are indeed regressive, but the long-term health benefits substantially
outweigh the current financial costs.120 Economists and think-tankers are
generally not low income, however, and tend to be easier to convince than
the masses paying a premium up front for their daily beverages,121 It
becomes even more difficult when the American Beverage Association
funds groups, such as Ax the Bev Tax, to publicly oppose the taxes.122
Sugar regulation advocates have long realized that it would be foolish
to put all of their eggs into one basket.123 Rather than centering the
campaign around tax incentives and punishments, some advocates believe
that a more effective answer to the obesity epidemic lies in educating the
masses through mandatory nutrition and public health disclosures.124
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CHILLED BEVERAGE SPEECH

The State of Mandatory Nutrition Disclosures

Public health advocates have called for marketing regulations to
protect consumers since substantial evidence emerged indicating food and
beverage advertising has a negative impact on public health, especially
when encouraging nutrient-poor and calorie-dense food.125 The Nutritional
Labeling and Education Act of 1990 imposed a myriad of requirements
upon food and beverage suppliers, most importantly the implementation
of the now iconic nutrition facts label.126 And the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) is still taking steps to make people more aware of
the food choices they are making by expanding the detail of disclosures
food manufacturers are required to make.127 The FDA now requires places
such as amusement parks, chain restaurants, and movie theaters to post
calorie counts on their menus.128 As of mid-2018, nutrition panels for
cereal boxes, candy bars, and every other packaged food item in the
supermarket require disclosure of how many grams of sugar were added
to the product.129
This is a sweet victory for soda regulation advocates. Discerning
added sugars from natural sugars can be difficult,130 and there are plenty
of healthy products that provide natural sugar, such as milk and tomato
juice.131 It is counterproductive for the public health and FDA agendas to
have these healthy beverages grouped with sodas and sports drinks for fear
of inadequate nutrition.132 Food and drink manufacturers would commonly
call sugar ingredients by deceptive names, such as high-fructose corn
syrup, but now those ingredients fall under the category of “added sugars”
on nutrition panels.133 And the numbers that appear on naturally sweetened
beverages’ sugar panels are accompanied by a zero under a distinct added125

Id.
Nutritional Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353.
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sugar category, which reminds consumers that not all sugar is artificially
added.
Nutritional labels are useful, however, only if the target audience is
reading them. Polls show that people making less than $30,000 per year
view the nutrition labels on food packages less often than those who make
more money, yet a still respectable sixty-eight percent of low income
people say they pay a “great deal” or “fair amount” of attention to nutrition
labels.134 But another study indicates people do not look at nutritional
labels as often as they claim.135 Eye-tracking data shows only nine percent
look at calorie counts nearly every time, despite a third of the study’s
participants claiming they “almost always” look at a product’s caloric
content.136 Some public health groups believe that enhancing nutritional
labels will be insufficient to curb the obesity epidemic and a more
aggressive measure should be taken to provide the public with the
knowledge of sugar’s long-term consequences, especially regarding
sugary drinks.137
These groups have called for mandatory warning labels on
advertisements for sugar-sweetened beverages like those on alcohol and
tobacco ads.138 Unlike sugar taxes, these warnings would not cost
taxpayers a penny.139 Yet the labels could provide vital knowledge for
current and potential contributors to the obesity epidemic, allowing them
to make more informed purchasing decisions.140 Warning labels on
tobacco products underwent criticism at their inception because opponents
claimed that smokers were adequately informed of the health risks.141
Research shows, however, that many smokers were unaware that smoking
increases the risk of stroke and over half did not believe smoking causes
impotence.142 Yet in areas with mandatory disclosures, smokers show a
significantly better understanding of smoking’s negative health
134
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consequences.143 The effect is especially felt in low-income areas because
the universal reach of mandatory disclosures are largely unaffected by
barriers to information.144
The same philosophy could apply to knowledge of sugar’s long-term
health effects. Studies show critics were correct when they said all
smokers know about lung cancer and cardiovascular disease,145 and they
will likely be correct if they say that almost all people understand sugar is
in soda and excessive amounts of it could lead to obesity. But some regular
soda consumers may not fully understand fruit juices’ contributions to
diabetes or the diseases that spawn from tooth decay,146 just like the many
smokers who did not fully comprehend the extent of smoking’s effects on
long-term health until they were consistently exposed to mandatory
warning labels.147
In 2014, California attempted to pass a bill that would have made it
the first state to experiment with the theory that mandatory warning labels,
like those on tobacco advertisements, could work with sugar-sweetened
beverages.148 But the bill failed in the state legislature.149 A year later, San
Francisco City and County lawmakers (“City” or “San Francisco”)
unanimously voted to require all sugar-sweetened beverage print
advertisements—defined as advertisements for “soda and other nonalcoholic beverages that contain one or more added sweeteners and more
than twenty-five calories per twelve fluid ounces of beverage”—to bear
the message: “WARNING: Drinking beverages with added sugar(s)
contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay. This is a message from
the City and County of San Francisco.” in a distinct black box on no less
than twenty percent of the advertisement.150

B.

ABA v. San Francisco

The American Beverage Association, California Retailers
Association, and the California State Outdoor Advertising Association
(“the Associations” or “ABA”) quickly filed suit for injunctive relief to
prevent the implementation of the ordinance.151 The crux of the
143
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Associations’ claim is that the warning creates a chilling effect on the
members’ speech in violation of their First Amendment right to freedom
of speech by requiring the Associations to bear an unjustified and undue
burden of conveying a controversial claim hostile to their own products as
a prerequisite to advertising them.152 San Francisco countered by claiming
there is a substantial government interest in informing the public about the
health risks of sugar, and thus the required warning is a justified burden
upon the Associations so long as the disclosure is factual, accurate, and
not misleading, which the City affirmatively posited for each claim.153

1. The Zauderer Exception
The first issue presented to the court was what level of scrutiny should
be applied to the warning.154 By default, speech regulations must be strictly
scrutinized under the First Amendment, and they are presumptively
unconstitutional.155 Many appellate circuits have, however, carved out an
exception for regulations that merely impose a disclosure requirement: the
Zauderer exception.156 The Associations argued Zauderer should not
apply because the Supreme Court has used Zauderer only after concluding
the challenged regulation’s purpose is to redirect misleading commercial
speech so as to prevent consumer deception, which is not applicable to the
ABA’s advertisements.157
The Ninth Circuit (on de novo review) and its district court disagreed
with the Associations and found that Zauderer is the appropriate standard
for the beverage disclosures.158 Under Zauderer,
a commercial speaker’s constitutionally protected interest
in refraining from providing consumers with additional
information is minimal if a required disclosure is ‘[1]
purely factual and [2] uncontroversial’ and is not ‘[3]
unjustified or unduly burdensome’ so as to chill protected
speech.159

152
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It is the government’s burden to meet this standard.160 However, the
Supreme Court had neither analyzed nor approved the Zauderer standard
at the time of the initial Ninth Circuit decision for the types of cases in
which courts had been applying it, namely “professional speech”
limitations. That changed in mid-2018 when the Supreme Court approved
Zauderer as an exception to strict scrutiny under certain circumstances,
but it refused to treat “professional speech as a unique category that is
exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles.”161
The Ninth Circuit struggled to interpret the Supreme Court’s opinion.
In a January 2019 rehearing decision, the full Ninth Circuit split as to
whether the San Francisco ordinance fell under the purview of Zauderer
and, if it did, how to apply the standard.162 But the court unanimously
found the ordinance was unconstitutional.163 The following subsections
summarize the district court’s and both of the Ninth Circuit’s opinions.

2. District Court
The ABA claimed the warning is misleading, and thus not purely
factual and uncontroversial, because
[The warning suggests that] (1) consuming beverages
with added sugar is dangerous regardless of one’s diet or
lifestyle; (2) consuming beverages with added sugar
necessarily and inevitably contributes to obesity [and]
diabetes; and (3) consuming beverages with added sugar
uniquely contributes to obesity and diabetes.164
Essentially, if sugar-sweetened beverage consumers were to have
moderate amounts of sugar with a healthy lifestyle, then the beverages
would not contribute to obesity or diabetes.165 It follows that the warning
San Francisco imposes should require a qualifier—overconsumption of
sugar-sweetened beverages contributes to obesity and diabetes—and it
must be imposed on all sugary products so to be fair and constitutional.166
an unfair perception that consumers would only have to pay contingently, and thus
regulation requiring full disclosure was fair because it was in the public’s interest, purely
factual, uncontroversial, and not unduly burdensome).
160
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161
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162
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Otherwise, they argue, the accuracy of the warning is in reasonable
dispute.167
The Northern District of California reached the opposite conclusion
and found the mandated warning is factual and accurate.168 The court also
dismissed the argument that the sugar warning was under-inclusive
because it was not placed on all advertisements for sugary products.169 The
court reasoned that sugar-sweetened beverages are a significant source of
calories, and overconsumption of calories contributes to the obesity
epidemic, which the government has a substantial public interest in
curbing.170 Thus, it is a reasonable strategy to piecemeal the regulatory war
on obesity first with sugar-sweetened beverage warnings, and it is
unreasonable to expect the government to regulate all sugar products at the
outset.171
As to the argument that the mandate is unjustified or unduly
burdensome, the court was not convinced that the Associations would
succeed on the merits of their claims.172 The Associations claimed that the
required size—no less than twenty percent of the advertisement—of the
warning forces the ABA to forgo print advertising because of its breadth,
and thus it is an undue burden.173 The district court rejected the argument,
relying on advertising experts claiming that tobacco product packaging
and labeling should bear a health warning of fifty percent to be effective.174
And, because the court was not without precedent for permitting the
twenty percent requirement, it would permit the requirement in this
instance.175
Also, the court found little credibility in claims that ABA members
will stop advertising in the market altogether “because tobacco companies
have still profited even with the required warnings on the tobacco products
themselves.”176 Throughout the analysis, the court did little to distinguish
between the differences of the effects of warnings on tobacco products and
warnings on sugar-sweetened beverage advertisements. But ultimately, it
used the sugar-tobacco comparison to reach the conclusion that beverage
advertisers are not unduly burdened by the San Francisco ordinance,
although it conceded the constitutional argument has some force.177
167
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3. Appellate Court Panel
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals gave more deference to the
Associations’ argument that the size of the warning will reduce ABA
members’ print advertisements in the San Francisco market to nearly
nil.178 The court further agreed that if a required disclosure effectively
rules out advertising in particular media, then it is unduly burdensome.179
The panel’s opinion concluded that, because the black box overwhelms
other visual elements in the advertisement, and it requires a conveyance of
San Francisco’s disputed policy views, the warning is an unconstitutional
burden on the Associations.180
Further, where the lower court found factual accuracy within the
Zauderer framework, the Ninth Circuit panel found controversy.181 The
court took issue that “the warning is required exclusively on
advertisements for sugar-sweetened beverages, and not on advertisements
for other products with equal or greater amounts of added sugars and
calories.”182 By singling out beverages and not mentioning behavioral
risks, the ordinance can potentially lead consumers to believe that there is
something innate about sugar-sweetened beverages that makes them a
uniquely substantial contributor to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay as
compared to something without a warning, such as candy.183 The research
is unsettled as to that conclusion and thus creates a deceptive message—
or so said the panel.184 The court also took issue that there is no mention
that added sugars are generally recognized as safe when not consumed in
excess amounts or when part of an otherwise healthy dietary pattern.185
Without sufficient qualifying language in the warning, the potential
misleading effect of the warning led the court to conclude that the warning
is, in effect, untrue and not purely factual, which accordingly chills the
Associations’ speech.186 However, this opinion would not last because the
Ninth Circuit granted an en banc rehearing.

4. The En Banc Opinions
Before the en banc rehearing, however, the United States Supreme
Court decided a case—National Institute of Family and Life Advocates
d/b/a NIFLA et al. v. Becerra (hereinafter “NIFLA”)—that clarified (or
178
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attempted to clarify) compelled commercial speech jurisprudence.187 The
Court affirmed Zauderer as an appropriate exception to the strict scrutiny
requirement for some First Amendment challenges.188 But the Court did
not clearly delineate the circumstances in which Zauderer will apply or
how it will apply, as evidenced by a split in the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning.
The Ninth Circuit unanimously decided that the ordinance is
unconstitutional, but there were four different opinions used to reach that
unanimity, and two of them found Zauderer did not apply here.189
Majority opinion: The court decided the case on the narrowest grounds
possible. It found that the size of the warning—no less than twenty percent
of the advertisement—created an undue burden on the manufacturers.190
Because the state’s goal could be accomplished with a smaller size, the
ordinance does not pass Zauderer’s undue burden requirement.191 The
court noted that NIFLA did not require the Zauderer elements be applied
in any particular order, so it began with the third element and forwent
analyzing the factual accuracy of the warning.192 Not every judge agreed
with this process or (lack of) analysis, however.
Ikuta’s dissent in reasoning and concurrence in result: Judge Ikuta
views Zauderer as a rational basis standard, not intermediate scrutiny.193
Ultimately, she reasoned that Zauderer does not apply and heightened
scrutiny was the appropriate standard here.194 If others agree, this would
spell trouble for future laws that mandate warnings for beverage
companies because the burden is on the government and it is a difficult
burden to meet.
Judge Ikuta premised this logic on two of the Supreme Court’s
conclusions in NIFLA. First, these types of warnings are “content-based”
compulsory
disclosures,
meaning
they
are
presumptively
unconstitutional.195 Second, the Court refused to treat any content-based
disclosures as exempt categories of speech under the First Amendment
unless it is the type of warning that has a “long tradition” of
permissibility.196 That is where the Zauderer exception comes in: “laws
that require professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial information

187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
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in their ‘commercial speech’” are given more deferential review because
they have a long history of permissibility.197
Judge Ikuta then set forth her interpretation of how Zauderer functions
in light of the recent NIFLA opinion:
To determine whether the Zauderer exception applies, a
court must consider whether the compelled speech
governs only [1] ‘commercial advertising’ and requires
the disclosure of [2] ‘purely factual and [3]
uncontroversial information about [4] the terms under
which . . . services will be available.’ (citation omitted). If
the government regulation meets those requirements, the
regulation should be upheld unless it is [5] ‘unjustified or
[6] unduly burdensome.’ (citation omitted). If the
regulation does not qualify for the Zauderer exception, the
regulation must survive heightened scrutiny to avoid
violating the First Amendment.198
Regarding the San Francisco ordinance, the threshold inquiry—
whether it is commercial advertising—is obviously satisfied. The second
inquiry, however, is not met because “[t]he factual accuracy of the warning
is disputed in the record.”199
Thus, the Zauderer exception does not apply, and the ordinance must
pass heightened scrutiny.200 It does not pass. The ordinance is “wildly
underinclusive” because (1) it does not apply “to all sugar-sweetened
beverages, much less all sugar-sweetened products” and (2) it does not
apply to all forms of advertising, such as television or radio.201
Accordingly, the ordinance must be struck down.
Christian and Thomas’s concurrence: This opinion argued Zauderer
applies, but it focused on the order in which to apply the factors.202 It noted
that the first two factors—purely factual and uncontroversial
information—were not at issue in NIFLA, which is why the Supreme Court
did not consider them.203 However, because they are the first two factors,
they should be considered prior to the undue burden analysis.204 Here, the
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message is literally false as to type 1 diabetes, so the ordinance fails the
first factor and the analysis should stop there.205
Nguyen concurrence: Judge Nguyen, in the same fashion as Judge
Ikuta, views Zauderer as a rational basis test, not intermediate scrutiny.206
But she believes Zauderer applies only to laws that regulate misleading
and false commercial speech, not all commercial speech.207 By default,
commercial speech is subject to intermediate scrutiny under the Central
Hudson standard.208 She opined that the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to expand Zauderer beyond deceptive commercial speech, but
it declined to do so.209 Because this ordinance is not designed to curb false
and misleading speech, the proper standard here is Central Hudson
intermediate scrutiny, which this ordinance fails to meet.210

C. Is it Purely Factual and Uncontroversial that Sugar-Sweetened
Beverages Contribute to the Obesity Epidemic?
Regardless of whether Zauderer or heightened scrutiny applies, future
warnings will need to carefully avoid statements that are not scientifically
considered fact because this ordinance failed both. The Ninth Circuit panel
concluded the warnings required by the San Francisco ordinance infringe
on free speech rights due, in part, to conflicting scientific philosophies
regarding sugar’s impact on the obesity epidemic.211 Likewise, some
concurring opinions in the en banc decision noted the warning is literally
false as to type 1 diabetes, and they mentioned several times that the
factual accuracy of the rest of the warning is in dispute.212 Much of the
controversy, however, involves who is performing the research, not
necessarily the findings.

1. Is the research corrupted?
A systemic review of systemic reviews found that studies conducted
with sponsorship or potential conflict of interest with food or beverage
companies were five times more likely to report a conclusion that there is
no association between sugar-sweetened beverages and obesity.213 Studies
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show that Coca-Cola Company or PepsiCo sponsored ninety-six health
organizations from 2011–15 and lobbied against twenty-nine proposed
public health bills in that period.214 Additionally, Coca-Cola Company has
provided financial and logistical support to a nonprofit organization,
Global Energy Balance Network, that broadcasts the argument that
Americans pay too much attention to sugar in their diets and insufficient
attention to their exercise habits.215 All of this suggests existing conflicts
of interest within the scientific community due to large beverage
companies’ financial influence.216 If the data derived from these studies is
tainted with corruption, then the scientific findings are likely not what is
in controversy.

2. Should sugary drinks be distinguished from non-beverage
sugar products?
Future beverage warnings also need to consider the court’s
underinclusive concerns: the warnings either need to be applied to all sugar
products or it must be uncontroversial that liquified sugar is more
responsible for diabetes, obesity, and tooth decay than sugar in food. Some
studies suggest they should be distinguished.217 Because liquified sugar is
delivered to the liver quicker than sugar in solid food, there may be a
higher risk of fat accumulation.218 But there is insufficient evidence from
sustained consumption studies to consider this uncontroversial.219
Many investigators argue that sugar-sweetened beverages are
particularly harmful because of the high concentration of sugar in a single
container, a low-satiety effect per calorie consumed, and the stimulation
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of appetite.220 The results of that hypothesis, however, are conflicted.221
Differences in designs and methodologies have created difficulties in
sustaining consistency across experiments.222 Some studies indicate that
consuming beverages before meals leads to overeating, which could
contribute to obesity if done regularly,223 but the same is true for milk in
addition to beverages with added sugars.224 Two other studies that
examined the effect of liquid-based sugar against solid-based sugar
seemed to show no significant difference.225

3. Can the warnings be constitutional if they are only on
beverages?
The scientific results produce two conflicting schools of thought
regarding the legality of mandatory disclosures for sugar-sweetened
beverages. The first school believes that sugar-sweetened beverages are
especially influential on the obesity epidemic and the public requires more
education on the matter.226 Proponents call for mandated warnings because
the public has difficulty adhering to recommended levels of sugar intake
with beverage companies’ current marketing and packaging practices.227
They believe the insufficiency of long-term studies is outweighed by the
data indicating high concentrations of added sugar leads to poor choices
among consumers.228 Neurological mechanisms produce addictive
qualities in the brain when consuming sugar, particularly liquified
sugar.229 This supports the notion that the obesity epidemic is a sugar
epidemic partly fueled by soda.230 The first school thus concludes that the
advertising disclosure mandated by San Francisco is accurate and not
220

See Richard Kohn & John L. Sievenpiper, Dietary Sugar and Body Weight: Have We
Reached a Crisis in the Epidemic of Obesity and Diabetes? We have, but the Pox on Sugar
is Overwrought and Overworked, DIABETES CARE 957, 959 (2014) http://care.
diabetesjournals.org/content/37/4/957.full-text.pdf.
221
See id.
222
See Vasanti S. Malik et al., Sugar Sweetened Beverages, Obesity, Type 2 Diabetes
and Cardiovascular Disease risk, 2010 CIRCULATION 1, 3 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pmc/articles/PMC2862465/pdf/nihms-189965.pdf.
223
See Kohn & Sievenpiper, supra note 220 at 959.
224
See Stijn Soenen & Margriet S. Westerterp-Plantenga, No differences in satiety or
energy intake after high-fructose corn syrup, sucrose, or milk preloads, 86 AM. J. CLINICAL
NUTRITION 1586, 1590 (Dec. 2007), http://ajcn.nutrition.org/content/86/6/1586.full.pdf+
html.
225
See Kohn & Sievenpiper, supra note 220, at 959.
226
See Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 5, Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City and Cty. of San
Francisco, 871 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2017) (Nos. 16-16072, 16-16073).
227
See id.
228
See id. at 6.
229
See Malik, supra note 222, at 9.
230
See id.

2019]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

297

misleading in the same way the statute requiring alcohol labels to warn
that “consumption of alcoholic beverages . . . may cause health problems”
is accurate and not misleading.231
The second school of thought disagrees that the San Francisco
mandate is comparable to alcohol disclosures because the phrase “may
cause health problems” tempers the effect of alcohol warnings and
equivalent language is absent from the sugar disclosures.232 Exponents
believe the warning becomes misleading without qualifying language
because moderate sugar consumption within a healthy lifestyle will not
lead to obesity, diabetes, or tooth decay.233 Further, because the warning
would appear only on beverages with added sugar and not on all products
with added sugar, the public could be misled into believing that sugarsweetened beverages are especially dangerous, and there is evidence to
contradict that notion.234 Thus, the warning mandated by San Francisco
places an unfair burden on beverage companies by requiring them “to
convey the City’s controversial opinion.”235 The warning is also unfair
because it does not require the same mandate on all other sugary products
that may contribute to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.236

IV.

POLICYMAKERS’ BEST OPTIONS FOR REGULATING SUGARSWEETENED BEVERAGES

The Ninth Circuit panel decision was in accordance with the second
school of thought:
[T]he warning singles out sugar-sweetened beverages
without mentioning behavioral risks, and thus clearly
implies that there is something inherent about sugarsweetened beverages that contributes to these health risks
in a way that other sugar-sweetened products do not,
regardless of consumer behavior.237
As a result, policymakers may resort to options other than the failed
San Francisco warning for fear of a First Amendment challenge. The court,
however, hinted that a qualification—”may contribute”—could suffice to
231
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bring the warning out of reasonable dispute.238 If a simple “may” is all the
court requires to pass constitutional muster, then advocates should be
clamoring for their representatives to pass conforming ordinances. But the
unfair burden on beverage companies would persist.
That is why requiring all producers of added sugar products—food
and beverage alike—to implement a warning like San Francisco’s is the
best option to attack the obesity epidemic. The ABA’s unfair burden
argument would collapse because the warning would no longer single out
any industry or producer. And the public at large would become more
informed of the dangers it is ingesting with its food and beverages.
Limiting the mandate to products with added sugar would spare healthy
products, such as fruits. Hungary has already experienced success with a
similar system.239 To reduce obesity and knock the United States off its
infamous perch as the most obese nation in history, advocates must
continue the war against sugar on two fronts—mandatory disclosures on
food and drinks.
Mandatory disclosures should not be the only weapon. Widespread
taxes on added sugar would provide consumers with a financial incentive
to eat and drink healthier substances, which should reduce obesity,
increase life expectancy, and save taxpayers long-term costs.240 Initial
research indicates that a sugar tax would accomplish those goals.241
Specifically, an input tax, such as the United Kingdom’s multi-tiered tax
on sugar-sweetened beverages, should encourage manufacturers to use
less sugar, thereby optimizing the tax’s potential to reduce obesity.242
Revenue from an added sugar tax could then be used to develop programs
that promote healthy choices and cheaper access to superior nutrition, like
the plan in Seattle.243
In 1965, forty-two percent of adults smoked cigarettes and that
number dwindled to less than seventeen percent by 2014.244 It did not take
many decades for cigarette taxes and warning labels to become
widespread, effectively reducing tobacco’s negative health effects through
education and economic incentives.245 Sugar may be no different. More
policymakers should take note of the United States’ position as the world’s
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most obese nation and largest sugar consumer,246 then enlist familiar
tactics—taxes and warning labels—to combat the obesity epidemic.
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